Load Balance Games
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Makespan scheduling on uniformly related machines
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n tasks with weights w1,…,wn
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m parallel mach in es with speeds s1,…,sm
- identical machines: s1 = s2 = ··· = sm = 1 I uniformly related machines: else
- A:[n]7→[m]…assignmentoftaskstomachines
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The load of machine j∈[m] under the assignment A is:

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Objective: minimize the make span, aka the maximum load overall machines
Definition of Load balancing games
- The task i∈[n] is managed by player
i
- The pure strategy A(i) for each player i∈[n] yields an assignment
A : [n] 7→ [m]
- Given an assignment
A
- the cost of player i is the load of the chosen machine l_A(i)
- the social cost is the makespan: cost(A) = maxj∈[m]{l_j}
Pure Nash equilibrium
An assignment A is a pure Nash equilibrium if for all players i ∈ [n] and all machines j ∈ [m]:

largest Processing Time (LPT)
- The Largest Processing Time (LPT) scheduling algorithm computes a pure Nash equilibrium in polynomial time. // 计算纯纳什均衡多项式时间
Algorithm
function LPTAlgorithm(arr) {
var res = [];
arr.forEach((val) => {});
}
Corollary 2.2
Every instance of the load balancing game admits a pure Nash equilibrium. // 所有负载平衡游戏的实例都可以使用纯纳什均衡
Best response sequences 1
Best response sequences 2
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Best response sequences
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Theorem 2.3
For every instance of the load balancing game with related machines every best response sequence terminates.
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Remark
- There are instances with identical machine that have sequences of length Ω(2^√n).
Best response sequences 3
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Theorem 2.4
- For identical machines the length of any sequence of best responses is at most 2^n.
// 对于相同的机器,任何最佳响应序列的长度都不超过 2^n
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Theorem 2.5
- Let A : [n] → [m] denote any assignment of n tasks to m identical machines. Starting from A, the max-weight best response policy reaches a pure Nash equilibrium after each agent was activated at most once.
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Lemma 2.6
- Suppose task i makes a best response: For all tasks j with wj ≥ wi , if j was satisfied before, it remains satisfied after i’s best response.
Price of Anarchy: Definition
- Price of anarchy: The
worst case ratio between the social cost in some Nash equilibrium (NE) and the optimum social cost.


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Goal: Find the exact PoA for a class of games and type of equilibria.
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Upper bound α: show that for all such instances and all such equilibria the PoA is at most α.
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Lower bound α: find such an instance and such an equilibrium where the PoA is at least α.
Bounds on the Price of Anarchy

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Form=2,theexampleonpreviousslideprovesthelowerbound in blue.
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Exercise:
Generalise this example to match the bound for all m.